Armenia’s 7th June parliamentary election delivered a decisive victory for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party. However, while Pashinyan secured a stable majority in parliament, the lack of a constitutional (two-thirds) majority will have a profound impact on Armenia’s post-war political, economic and trade normalization process with Azerbaijan (and Türkiye).
Without a two-thirds majority, Pashinyan cannot pursue the constitutional changes he has identified as a prerequisite for finalizing the peace agreement with Baku, leaving the process uncertain. This could be the key political constraint of the new parliamentary term and how Pashinyan’s new government navigates this constraint will be the defining political challenge of the coming years. In parallel, the new parliament will include a larger share of pro-Russian formations, which follows an unprecedented level of Russian interference into the election campaign.
The incoming government is widely expected to continue its established trajectory across most policy tracks. Engagement with the EU and the US will remain priorities, including through Yerevan’s objective to secure a visa liberalization agreement with Brussels, the US-based Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) project and US-Armenian semiconductor and AI development. Armenia is also likely to continue operating within the EAEU while deterioration in relations with Russia may continue, with Yerevan’s membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) formally frozen.
The election result also sharpens the question of Russia’s posture toward Armenia in the period ahead. Moscow’s use of an economic embargo during the campaign period as an instrument of electoral pressure was a signal of both intent and capability. With that pressure having failed to alter the outcome, Russia faces a choice between continued coercive engagement and a tactical recalibration. The presence of a well-resourced, Russia-linked opposition in parliament provides Moscow with a lever for indirect influence. For Yerevan, managing this relationship without provoking escalation while continuing its Western pivot will remain one of the most delicate balancing acts of the new government’s mandate.
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