ARETERA
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE'S NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Regional Defence Policy Overview

22 October 2026

INTRODUCTION

Russia's war in Ukraine has placed Central & Eastern Europe under its most sustained security pressure in decades. Within NATO and the EU, the CEE region is perceived as an integral theatre of Europe's defence and security efforts and is turning into a direct target of hybrid operations. Several governments across the region have responded by prioritizing defence and security spending, including the construction and protection of critical infrastructure, with most regional governments focused on increasing defence capabilities.

An important trend in the defence and security sector in CEE is that most regional markets are looking to convert their own spending increases into domestic capacity rather than simply importing and funding one-off projects. Slovakia has doubled arms exports, Poland's target of keeping 89% of SAFE spending domestic, new industry laws in Lithuania and Ukraine's wartime production scale-up under its Defence City regime all point the same way – CEE's cost and talent base is pulling in capital and investment. In terms of the pace of spending, approaches continue to differ. Lithuania (5.4% of GDP) and Poland (4.51% in its 2027 draft budget) are already well past NATO's new target, while Czechia and Hungary are moving up more slowly. CEE can thus be defined as a multi-speed flank. EU membership is widening this gap: every EU member in the analysed set of markets has a SAFE allocation, while Ukraine is locked out of these funds and falls back on the European Peace Facility, bilateral deals or indirect participation instead. An additional fracture line between regional markets is support for Ukraine: the Bulgarian and Slovak governments block military aid for Kyiv, Czechia's coalition is internally split, while Hungary's new government is reorienting towards the West while still capping real spending increases.

As financing announcements, policy pledges, new instruments and institutions accumulate, the question of political will and capability to improve resilience and deliver on key projects will rely on durable political consensus at national and international levels and effective cross-border public-private cooperation efforts.

Below, Aretera takes a deeper look at the latest defence policy trends in Poland, Romania, Ukraine, Czechia, the Baltic states, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia.

NATO & EU RESPONSES TO THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

NATO has reacted to the new security environment by approving a €27 billion overhaul of its Cold War-era fuel pipeline and distribution network, extending reliable logistics directly into the frontline states, with Poland named as a principal beneficiary. At the Ankara summit in July 2026, Allies pledged €70 billion in military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine for 2026 and affirmed their sovereign commitments to sustaining at least equivalent levels in 2027. The same summit reaffirmed the Hague-era commitment to 3.5% (of GDP) core spending plus 1.5% related investment (usually for critical infrastructure), and 5% by 2035. Poland is already running well ahead of that target and is set to reach close to 4.8% of GDP in 2026. CEE countries are also helping to build the financing architecture around the Alliance: Latvia, Romania and Ukraine are among the founding signatories of the new Defence, Security and Resilience Bank, created during the Ankara summit to mobilize public and private capital. Romania will host the bank's regional office for NATO's southern flank, with operations expected to begin as early as 2027.

The EU has matched that urgency, driven by the same security picture and growing concern over US commitment to guaranteeing Europe's defence. The €150 billion SAFE instrument is now being disbursed: Poland has received an initial €6.6 billion in pre-financing and Romania €2.5 billion, with the remainder released against delivery milestones through 2030. In parallel, the EU has approved the first five European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs):

- drone/counter-drone technology (European Resolve/DECODER),
- maritime and seabed defence (IMSD),
- space-based early warning (SPACE),
- integrated air and missile defence (EU-FIAMD)
- and – most relevant to the region – Eastern Flank Watch, to boost security through an integrated air, drone and missile early-warning network along the EU's eastern border.

Together, these represent an estimated €190 billion in investment potential to 2036. The EU Commission's related €1.5 billion European Defence Industry Program (EDIP) is now funding supply-chain fixes and ammunition production across CEE, explicitly covering the EU and Ukraine's defence industry. Collective EU spending reached a record €418 billion in 2025 (2.2% of GDP, up 20% on 2024) and is projected to reach €454 billion in 2026 and (according to the European Defence Agency) up to €547 billion by 2029 if current trends hold.

POLAND PLAYS LEADING ROLE IN REGIONAL DEFENCE & DETERRENCE

The defence policy of the largest CEE economy is centred on deterrence and territorial defence against the threat from Russia, accelerated military modernization and strengthening national resilience. The Armed Forces Development Program 2025–2039 prioritizes integrated air and missile defence, ammunition and strategic reserves, drones and counter-UAS systems, reconnaissance, mobility and logistics, training and readiness. A flagship project is the East Shield, a comprehensive defence infrastructure program along the borders with Russia and Belarus, combining fortifications, surveillance, communications and civil-protection infrastructure. The investment scale remains substantial: the Tusk Government's draft 2027 budget provides PLN 198.1 billion for national defence, equivalent to 4.51% of the projected GDP.

A significant recent development is the creation of a domestic framework for using the EU's SAFE instrument: the government prepared legislation establishing the Financial Instrument for Increasing Security, enabling Poland to borrow, manage and deploy SAFE financing for eligible defence investments. Separately, a Presidential bill submitted to Parliament in March proposes a Polish Defence Investment Fund, intended to finance the technical modernization of the Armed Forces. Warsaw is also developing a Defence Industry Development Strategy 2026–2030, focused on innovation, modernization, exports and stronger state support instruments. Civil preparedness is being developed in parallel through recently adopted amendments to the Population Protection and Civil Defence Act.

The National Security Strategy adopted in July 2025 identifies four overarching priorities: territorial integrity, citizens' security, sustainable development and an international security system favourable to Poland, with Russia identified as the primary threat. Other priorities include comprehensive defence, civil protection, critical-infrastructure resilience, modernization, strengthening NATO and the EU, maintaining the strategic partnership with the US and continued support for Ukraine.

Poland is the largest beneficiary of SAFE, with an allocation of €43.7 billion for 2026–2030. The country received the first €6.6bn pre-financing payment in May. Planned investments include East Shield, artillery, air and missile defence, drones/counter-drone capabilities, ammunition, land systems and military mobility infrastructure. The government expects 89% of SAFE-funded procurement to benefit the domestic industry and economy. In parallel, Poland, under its EU recovery plan, established a Security and Defence Fund, worth approximately PLN 23 billion (€5.2 billion). In parallel, Warsaw remains firmly transatlantic, NATO-centred and supportive of a stronger European defence pillar, treating these dimensions as complementary rather than alternatives, with the US remaining the principal strategic partner. In September, Poland secured an additional $ 4 billion in US Foreign Military Financing, supporting existing modernization programs, including Apache helicopters. However, Poland is expanding its European bilateral defence cooperation, including through its new security and defence partnership with the UK.

DEFENCE SPENDING ACROSS CEE

Long-Maturity Loans to CEE Member States under the EU's SAFE Program		
Country	**Total Allocation (€ billion)**	**Already Disbursed (€ billion)**
Bulgaria	3.26	0.49
Croatia	1.7	0.25
Czechia	2.06	-
Estonia	2.3	0.35
Hungary	5.4 (cut from 16.4)	-
Latvia	3.49	0.52
Lithuania	6.37	0.95
Poland	43.73	0.66
Romania	16.68	2.5
Slovakia	2.3	-
Slovenia	not yet participating	not yet participating

Source: European Commission

ROMANIA FOCUSES ON COUNTERING KEY REGIONAL RISKS

Romania's defence policy is anchored in the National Defence Strategy 2025–2030, adopted in November 2025 around President Nicușor Dan's concept of "solidary independence". The Strategy identifies Russian hybrid threats and instability in Ukraine and Moldova as key regional risks. It commits Romania to 5% of GDP by 2035 (3.5% core, 1.5% related) and names the revitalization of the national defence industry as a strategic objective. The 2026 budget allocates 2.42% of GDP to the Ministry of National Defence. Combined defence spending will reach 3.7% of GDP this year.

SAFE is the main engine of the current procurement cycle. Romania holds the second-largest allocation after Poland (€16.68 billion). Of this, €12.48 billion is earmarked for defence and security equipment and €4.2 billion for dual-use motorways towards the Ukrainian and Moldovan borders. €2.5 billion arrived in pre-financing in August. Contracts concluded before the end-May deadline are dominated by a €5.7 billion Rheinmetall package of 298 Lynx combat vehicles, 7 Skynex air defence systems, over 400,000 rounds of medium-calibre, and 4 naval vessels. Deliveries run from 2028 to 2030, with over 50% of production in Romania and more than 200 local subcontractors. Other awards include 231 Mistral launchers and 934 missiles through European joint procurement (€625.6 million) and, in October, 12 Airbus H225M helicopters ordered through France's DGA to replace the IAR-330 Puma fleet. Two programs stalled on price; 139 Piranha 5 vehicles and 1,115 multipurpose transport platforms, and their funds are being redirected to joint procurement or other programs. A second SAFE call of around €20 billion, expected before the year-end, will open the option of additional financing.

The National Defence Industry Strategy prioritises powders and explosives, ammunition, armoured vehicles, aeronautics, shipbuilding, and cyber and loitering munitions. Rheinmetall and national defence firm Romarm are accordingly developing a €535 million powder plant at Victoria. Rheinmetall has also held advanced talks on an ammunition joint venture with Romarm's Mediaș factory. In parallel, a Romania–Ukraine agreement signed in March earmarks €200 million in SAFE funding for a plant producing Ukrainian-designed drones on Romanian soil. These programs run alongside major US acquisitions, including 32 F-35As contracted in November 2024, Abrams tanks, Patriot and HIMARS.

Romania remains firmly pro-Western, joining the multinational GlobalEye purchase and NATO's Drone Edge initiative at Ankara. The key watchpoint is domestic politics. Prior to the formation of the Niculescu Government on 20th October, the caretaker cabinet signed the SAFE contracts amid criticism from certain parties over the share awarded to foreign suppliers. The defence component of the 2027 budget and the next wave of contracts accordingly depend on a stable majority in parliament.

UKRAINE'S DEFENCE EVOLVES AROUND REPELLING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

Ukraine's defence market is evolving around a clear strategic objective: to repel Russian aggression and establish a foundation for long-term deterrence of possible future aggression. The immediate priorities are dictated by current frontline needs: today these are air defence against Russia's jet-powered drones and missile strikes on cities and civil infrastructure, drones and long-range artillery. Speed of delivery and scalable production are central market requirements. Ukraine remains open to expanding cooperation with international partners, attracting investment and establishing joint production, including on partners' territory as it lacks production facilities and capacity, which have been significantly reduced by constant Russian attacks.

Recent modernization measures aim to support domestic military production. In 2025, parliament introduced the Defence City regime, which offers eligible manufacturers tax incentives, including conditional relief for reinvested profits, as well as simplified customs procedures and support for

protecting or relocating production. Last November, Ukraine opened controlled wartime arms exports and launched a transparent export mechanism in July that keeps frontline needs first and requires partners producing Ukrainian designs for third markets to pay 20% of product value to the state budget.

Following Donald Trump's re-election as US President and a significant reduction in US assistance, the EU has become Ukraine's central financier. The €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026-2027 earmarks €60 billion for defence industrial capacity and procurement. The fourth defence tranche of €3.3 billion, paid in September, funds drones and missiles. In addition, under the €150 billion SAFE instrument, Ukraine can participate in joint procurement on equal terms with EU members, although only Member States receive SAFE loans. Together, these mechanisms create opportunities for partnerships that combine Ukrainian technology with European financing and procurement demand. However, questions remain over Ukraine's EU funding as Kyiv is seeking additional support from the bloc for 2027.

This comes as Ukraine's geopolitical orientation remains unchanged. EU and NATO membership are strategic priorities enshrined in Ukraine's Constitution. At the same time, rapid EU accession is unlikely, and the US firmly opposes Ukraine joining NATO.

CZECH COALITION TENSION OVER GEOPOLITICS STALLS DEFENCE SPENDING

Czechia's formal defence framework prioritizes NATO collective defence, deterrence and readiness for high-intensity conflict. The country's modernization needs include new armoured vehicles, drone production, interceptor capabilities and logistics. Separately, the Ministry of Defence is working on updating the Development Concept of the Army (KVAČR), planning for 2040. The current KVAČR for 2035 was approved in 2023. The new version is understood to be ready, but its publication has been delayed; reporting attributes this to further requests from PM Babiš, though that specific explanation has not been independently confirmed.

The government set a 2% of GDP spending target for defence, while another fiscal amendment allows sectoral spending above that level to sit outside expenditure ceilings through 2033. The 2026 budget provides around 1.7% of GDP for the Defence Ministry. PM Babiš has pledged to reach 2% in 2027, but the government has not set out a funded path for faster increases. While the need for increased defence spending is acknowledged, current political dynamics suggest that a significant increase remains unlikely due to coalition tensions.

In a significant recent statement, PM Babiš said that if Russia attacked a Baltic NATO member, Czechia would act under Article 5 and send two mechanized brigades to help NATO allies. This is a concrete political signal of Alliance solidarity; the two-brigade contribution is Babiš' stated response scenario, not a force allocation prescribed by Article 5 itself. Overall defence priorities and long-term strategy, however, may be hindered by different coalition views on Czechia's roles in international politics. While ANO and the junior coalition Motorists see Czechia as a firm element of NATO, the third member of the coalition, the Eurosceptic SPD, is advocating for neutral positions and supporting neither Ukraine nor US positions in the Middle East.

The Babiš Cabinet has kept the Czech-led ammunition initiative in support of Ukraine but says Czechia will coordinate and provide procurement expertise without further state funding. In May, the Defence Ministry reported contracts for around one million large calibre rounds for delivery in 2026. Under SAFE, Czechia has been approved for up to €2.06 billion in loans, including €309 million in pre-financing; the national plan was submitted before the current government took office, so implementation and procurement priorities merit monitoring.

Despite a less supportive government narrative than under the previous government, support for Ukraine remains a key foreign policy priority, as does EU/NATO membership. The current government combines a stated willingness to contribute to NATO collective defence with a more restrained approach to defence spending and direct support for Ukraine. The gap between Babiš' recent Article 5 statement and the slower budget trajectory remain an important political and policy watchpoint.

HUNGARY YET TO UNDERTAKE DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW

Following the change of government in May, Hungarian defence policy is set to undergo major changes, driven by the country's reorientation towards Western allies and a repair of its previously strained relations with NATO. While the governing TISZA party is yet to lay out a new defence strategy, the Magyar Government has signalled the likely future direction: Hungary aims to focus on increasing defence spending from the current 2% level to 3.5% of GDP by 2035, in line with NATO obligations.

Defence Minister Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi has indicated no additional funding is expected beyond 2% for the first two years due to other priorities, particularly healthcare and social policy, as suggested by the draft budget for 2027. Spending will likely be rationalized, with focus shifting towards domestic manufacturing and continued reliance on proven, already-fielded systems, away from high-level prestige investments, to build a more resilient force. As for the EU's SAFE program, Hungary originally requested €16 billion of the loans available, but now only intends to draw €5.4 billion, with the government pointing to already large debt levels as a justification for the lower need. Most of the EU loan is expected to be earmarked for financing existing defence contracts and bringing forward cybersecurity and logistics developments.

DEFENCE SPENDING ACROSS CEE

Defence Spending (Ratio-to-GDP)		
Country	**2025 (%)**	**2026 (%)**
Bulgaria	2.13	2.22
Croatia	2.07	2.03
Czechia	1.86	2.01
Estonia	3.93	5.10
Hungary	2.06	2.09
Latvia	3.67	4.92
Lithuania	4.03	5.33
Poland	4.25	4.68
Romania	2.19	2.43
Slovakia	2.03	2.02
Slovenia	1.57	1.61
Ukraine	40	44-46

NATO member spending rate calculated under the Alliance's definition. Source: NATO / Government of Ukraine

BALTIC STATES SEE MASSIVE DEFENCE EXPANSION

Maintaining permanent Allied presence, Lithuania is undergoing one of the fastest defence expansions in Europe, driven by Russia's war against Ukraine and related threats. Defence spending should reach 5.4% of GDP in 2026, with around 60% directed towards modernization and force expansion. Key priorities are the development of the 1st National Division, integrated air and missile defence, drones/counter-UAS and electronic warfare, ammunition stocks, long-range fires, heavy land capabilities, with military infrastructure. Defence policy aims to combine procurement with domestic industrial capacity and supply-chain resilience. Lithuania's Defence and Security Industry Law, in force since 2024 and further amended in 2025-26, provides the policy framework for developing local production and R&D. Government priorities include ammunition and explosives, drones/counter-drone technologies, military equipment manufacturing and maintenance, and naval capabilities. Lithuania is also actively seeking foreign investment and localization of production, while EU financing (€6.4 billion under SAFE) has become an important economic accelerator. Although Lithuania spent just over 45% of its 2026 defence budget by 14th October, the government confirmed that the full budget will be spent by the end of the year.

In Estonia, defence policy is built around the Comprehensive National Defence approach, underlining a collective societal approach and supplementing the compulsory conscription of male citizens, NATO as a defence pillar and the high emphasis on cyber defence. Tallinn also hosts the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), and the EU's IT agency, eu-LISA. The main investment focus is on capabilities through human resources, the constant modernization of ammunition stocks and completing physical infrastructure projects. In keeping with Estonia's digital focus, it is also developing AI and space strategies. In terms of SAFE financing, Estonia secured a loan up to €2,3 billion, in line with the commitment to increasing defence spending to 5% of GDP.

Latvia, which combines firm NATO orientation with growing Nordic-Baltic-European cooperation, has moved from a deterrence-by-alliance model towards a more comprehensive national position, driven by the long-term threat from Russia. Riga increasingly emphasizes that credible collective defence requires substantially stronger national capabilities, resilience and allied readiness. Defence spending has become a central instrument, with Latvia allocating 4.73% of GDP in 2026, set to pass 5% from 2027 under the recently amended Law on National Defence Financing. Over 50% of the budget is allocated to strengthening the National Armed Forces' combat capabilities, tactical hardware and systems, infantry fighting vehicle platforms, layered air defence networks and drone technologies. Critical parallel priorities include investment to build anti-mobility infrastructure along the eastern border, fostering the domestic defence industry through dedicated manufacturing partnerships, and sustaining a fixed long-term commitment to support Ukraine with 0,25% of Latvia's GDP. The EU's SAFE financing covers drones, munitions and counter-drone systems, while Riga is working with its two neighbours on bolstering the Baltic Defence Line.

SLOVAKIA: BROAD MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WITH FOCUS ON PRODUCTION

Slovakia is pursuing a broad military modernization program while placing increasing emphasis on domestic production, skilled employment, technology transfer and export capacity. Major capability upgrades include the introduction and expansion of the country's US-purchased F-16 fleet, while Bratislava also received the €560 million BARAK MX air-defence system in April, with local industrial participation being a part of the program.

This industrial focus is also reflected in Slovakia's use of the SAFE instrument. The country has been approved for up to €2.3 billion in loans across nine projects, with the largest allocations going to Tatra military trucks (€1.6 billion) and CV90 infantry fighting vehicles (€480 million). Other projects cover ammunition, small arms, engineering equipment and artillery. Slovakia and Poland also signed a September letter of intent covering ammunition and possible Slovak participation in Poland's SAN counter-drone program. Meanwhile, domestic production is expanding rapidly. Arms and ammunition exports more than doubled to €2.4 billion in 2025.

The expansion creates opportunities beyond equipment supply, particularly in production technology, automation, robotization and industrial security, while cooperation with Poland could open further counter-UAS opportunities. NATO remains Slovakia's principal security anchor, although the Fico Government opposes state-funded military assistance to Ukraine and favours allocating part of higher defence spending to dual-use projects, including hospitals and transport infrastructure.

CROATIA & SLOVENIA FOCUS ON MODERNIZATION

Croatia's Defence Strategy prioritizes a small, agile force replacing Soviet-era kit with NATO systems by 2030, by when spending is expected to reach 3% of GDP by 2030. Key modernizations include Rafale fighters, Bradley IFVs, Black Hawk helicopters, HIMARS and a planned €1.6bn corvette acquisition linked to local shipyard technology transfer. Domestic industry highlights include DOK-ING (an unmanned military systems partnership with Rheinmetall) and Orqa (for FPV drones). The strategy also focuses on border defence, rapid mobilization and hybrid resilience. Accordingly, Croatia is positioning itself as a regional hub for cyber defence, hosting joint NATO cyber training exercises. Meanwhile, mandatory 2-month military service was reintroduced in March 2026 (aiming to train 4,000 recruits/year), along with a new government framework to support FDI in defence manufacturing, including Beretta's €125m ammunition plant in the city of Dalmatia. This is accompanied by the active use of SAFE allocations, committed for Leopard 2A8 tanks, CAESAR howitzers, and Tatra military trucks.

The country's orientation remains firmly pro-Western, with France as the core strategic partner, alongside deepening US defence ties. Croatia signed a tri-lateral defence declaration with Albania and Kosovo in 2025, while maintaining strong support for Ukraine.

Slovenia's National Security Strategy prioritizes NATO collective defence, as well as building capabilities in battle group readiness, air defence, artillery, air transport, CBRN defence, unmanned systems, ammunition, cyber defence and intelligence reform. Key signed contracts include three IRIS-T SLM batteries (€371.8 million, 2027–2029) and 12 CAESAR howitzers (€91.1 million), procured government-to-government via Germany, France and NSPA.

Adopted last June, the resolution on the long-term development and equipping of the Slovenian Armed Forces to 2040 raises spending to 3% of GDP by 2030 and sets a 10,000-strong peacetime force. Last July, the government adopted Slovenia's first defence-industrial strategy, including a state investment holding. After NATO criticized earlier figures for relying on dual-use infrastructure, the 2026 supplementary budget added €296 million, lifting core spending to 2.03% of GDP. Execution remains a bottleneck: only 46% of permitted investment funds were spent in 2021–2025, and the force numbers about 7,600 against its 10,000 target.

Slovenia did not apply for SAFE loans in the first round, arguing it could borrow on comparable terms, but is now considering the second. It already benefits from EU joint procurement (IRIS-T via the EDIRPA-supported JAMIE project) and EDIP's drone initiative, while defence R&D funding is set to rise from €28.3 million towards €50 million.

BULGARIA PLANS DEFENCE MODERNIZATION BY 2032

Bulgaria's defence modernization plan is established in Program 2032, a roughly €15 billion, two-stage plan to replace Soviet-era equipment with about 180 new NATO-interoperable capabilities by 2032. The live program sits mostly in the navy and air force: the first of two French-built multi-purpose patrol ships was commissioned in end-2025. Alongside a Gowind-derived corvette programme and a Naval Strike Missile coastal-defence system cleared for purchase in January, a seven-unit 3D radar network from France's DGA followed. The air force remains in mid-transition from Soviet-era MiG-29s to F-16 Block 70s from the US, in the process of being delivered. Program 2032 is currently being updated but no draft has been made public. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov is pushing to raise defence-procurement spending thresholds that have stood since 2010 and to keep defence spending outside the formal budget-deficit count. Both remain at the proposal stage.

Last updated in 2025, the National Defence Strategy names four priority areas. These include building and developing defence capabilities adequate to the security environment, care for people in defence and recruitment, strengthening deterrence in the Black Sea region and host-nation support for Allied forces, and building national resilience against hybrid, climate and military-conflict shocks.

Bulgaria's defence policy spending centres on a gradual rise toward NATO's Hague commitment, implemented through a national plan to reach 5% of GDP on defence by 2035 (3.5% core, 1.5% defence-related). Core spending is 2.15% of GDP in 2026, with the Defence Ministry noting that 2027 spending is planned at 2.33%, rising steadily to 2.85% by 2030. Bulgaria's SAFE allocation is a €3.26 billion loan ceiling, with a 15% advance (€489.3 million).

Since Prime Minister Rumen Radev assumed office in May, Bulgaria has turned more sovereigntist without breaking ranks with the Euro-Atlantic bloc. Sofia briefly blocked the EU's latest Russia sanctions package in June, halted state (though not commercial) arms transfers to Ukraine the same month, and left the "Coalition of the Willing," even as Radev met President Zelenskyy twice and endorsed NATO's Ankara declaration on Russia in July.

###

If you would like to schedule a discussion of this paper, please contact:
Dominik Istrate**, Research Director for Central & Eastern Europe, at **D.Istrate@AreteraPA.com

Aretera is a leading independent public affairs advisory firm operating across Central & Eastern Europe, Türkiye, Central Asia and a growing number of global emerging markets. We advise a wide range of leading multi-national corporations, providing counsel on all aspects of public policy, public affairs and reputation management. **www.areterapa.com**